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Abstract
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are 
major players in the global markets. 
This paper examines the possible value 
SWFs bring to their domestic hold-
ings by examining the impact of SWF 
ownership on firms’ executive compen-
sation. Using data on Kuwaiti SWFs, we 
find that having an SWF as an ultimate 
owner enhances the pay–performance 
sensitivity (PPS) to levels matching 
those in more developed markets. 
This pay–performance enhancement 
increases as the rights of the SWF to 
manage and oversee the firm’s cash-
flow increase. Moreover, having an SWF 
as the firm’s ultimate owner alleviates 
the adverse effects of the divergence in 
cash-flow and control rights. This evi-
dence supports the notion that SWFs 
create value for their target investments 
through activism, monitoring and cor-
porate governance enhancements.
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Introduction
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are significant players in today’s global markets, holding 
shares in one of every five firms worldwide and accounting for about 2 percent of global 
equity and bonds markets.1 They are quite distinct from other institutional investors due 
to their state ownership, mixed objectives, and, for many, no liability structure.2 Lately, 
there has been significant debate and different findings as to whether SWFs are active 
investors that create or destroy value for their investments or if they are merely passive 
investment managers.3 In this paper, one effect SWFs may have on their firm holdings will 
be examined: the impact upon the firm’s corporate governance. Specifically, we intend to 
examine how SWFs might enhance or diminish the pay–performance relationship for the 
firm’s executives.
Executive compensation is an essential element of corporate governance that incentivises 
managers to work in the interest of shareholders and reduce agency costs.4 Given their 
position as one of the largest shareholders in many firms worldwide, if they are not the 
largest outright, SWFs have considerable monitoring incentives and influence on manage-
rial pay.5 This monitoring is achieved through the tendency to have SWF representatives 
on corporate boards in addition to the corporate governance enhancement proposals 
they put forward.6 In fact, large and institutional shareholders have been documented as 
positively affecting the pay–performance relationship.7
1  Nuno Fernandes, ‘The impact of sovereign wealth funds on corporate value and performance’, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance 26/1 (2014), pp. 76–84; John Gieve et al., ‘Sovereign wealth funds and global 
imbalances’, Revue d’économie financière 9/1 (2009), pp. 163–77.
2  William L. Megginson and Veljko Fotak, ‘Rise of the fiduciary state: A survey of sovereign wealth fund 
research’, Journal of Economic Surveys 29/4 (2015), pp. 733–78.
3  Bader Alhashel, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: A literature review’, Journal of Economics and Business 78 
(2015), pp. 1–13.
4  Adolf Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991); Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics 3/4 (1976), pp. 305–60; 
Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, ‘Performance pay and top-management incentives’, Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 98/2 (1990), p. 225.
5  John Core and Wayne Guay, ‘The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 28/2 (1999), pp. 151–84; Michael Jensen and Jerold B. Warner, ‘The 
distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors’, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 20 (1988), pp. 3–24; Kevin Murphy, ‘Executive compensation’, Handbook of Labor Economics 3 
(1999), pp. 2485–563.
6  Alhashel, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds’.
7  Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks, ‘Institutional investors and executive compensation’, The Journal 
of Finance 58/6 (2003), pp. 2351–74; Neslihan Ozkan, ‘Do corporate governance mechanisms influence 
CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies’, Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management 17/5 (2007), pp. 349–64; Stephen G. Sapp, ‘The impact of corporate governance on execu-
tive compensation’, European Financial Management 14/4 (2008), pp. 710–46.
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However, recent evidence indicates that the influence of the largest shareholder on 
executive pay differs based on the type of shareholder.8 Furthermore, depending on the 
ownership structure, large shareholders may not always set proper incentive schemes 
for managers.9
This capacity to influence firms’ decisions is much greater in economies with concen-
trated ownership where the largest shareholder, or shareholders, tend to dominate the 
board, control the firm and, consequently, set executive pay.10 In such economies, and 
with concentrated ownership, comes the divergence of the cash-flow and control rights of 
the controlling shareholders that has been shown to be harmful to firm value.11 This diver-
gence allows large shareholders to influence firm decisions through voting rights despite 
relatively smaller cash-flow rights. Moreover, it allows majority shareholders and man-
agers to expropriate from the firm at the expense of minority shareholders.12 Managerial 
rent-seeking may then occur in such a setting as managers receive pay not commensurate 
with their performance.13 Managerial rent-seeking is even more prevalent in economies 
with weak investor protections.14 Therefore, given the distinct features of SWFs, their sig-
nificant ownership stakes in firms, and the weakly governed economies they operate in, it 
is essential to understand the impact they have on executive pay.
Using data on Kuwaiti firms over the period 2004–12, we find that in firms where the ulti-
mate shareholder is an SWF, managers have a higher pay–performance sensitivity (PPS). 
SWFs’ ownership increases PPS by 4–5 times its base levels, a very substantial increase. 
Such a considerable effect adds great value to the firm by reducing agency costs. This 
higher sensitivity is only valid when using accounting-based measures and not with a 
market-based performance measure. SWFs’ positive influence is again demonstrably 
considerable, with a one standard deviation increase in their cash-flow rights increas-
ing PPS threefold. However, PPS deteriorates as the divergence between the control and 
cash flow-rights increase (i.e., the firm is further down the ownership chain and remote 
from the ultimate shareholder). Nevertheless, having an SWF as the ultimate owner along 
this chain significantly reduces the adverse effect of the cash-flow / control rights diver-
gence. We have chosen Kuwait as a case study because it is host to one of the oldest and 
8  Michael Firth, Peter M. Y. Fung and Oliver M. Rui, ‘Corporate performance and CEO compensation in 
China’, Journal of Corporate Finance 12/4 (2006), pp. 693–714.
9  Kun Wang and Xing Xiao, ‘Controlling shareholders tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence 
from China’ Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 30/1 (2011), pp. 89–100.
10  Firth et al., ‘Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China’.
11  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan and Larry Lang,‘Disentangling the incentive and entrench-
ment effects of large shareholdings’ The Journal of Finance, 57/6 (2002), pp. 2741–71.
12  Charles J. P. Chen, Zengquan Li, Xijia Su and Zheng Sun, ‘Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political 
connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence’, Journal of Corporate Finance 
17/2 (2011), pp. 229–43.
13  Jerry Cao, Xiaofei Pan and Gary Tian, ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance 
relationship: Evidence from China’s listed firms’, Journal of Corporate Finance 17/3 (2011), pp. 541–54.
14  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Corporate ownership around the 
world’, The Journal of Finance 54/2 (1999), pp. 471–517; Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Tunneling’, American Economic Review 90/2 (2000), pp. 22–7.
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largest SWFs in the world. The latest estimate for Kuwait’s largest SWF, the Kuwait Invest-
ment Authority (KIA), is $524 billion, ranking it as the fourth largest SWF in the world.15 
Another major SWF in Kuwait is the Public Institution for Social Security (PIFSS), which 
has an estimated size of $30 billion.16 These Kuwaiti SWFs have significant holdings in the 
domestic market in which they take an active role, as evidenced by their board represen-
tation. These holdings ensure that the SWFs have a clear outlet to voice their opinion on 
the firms’ affairs, in general, and regarding executive compensation, specifically. Finally, 
Kuwaiti SWFs’ investments offer a unique ability to alleviate some of the endogeneity con-
cerns with executive compensation and ownership structure. Reducing the endogeneity 
concern is important since one could otherwise propose that SWFs do not bring moni-
toring value to their holdings, but are instead attracted to properly run firms with sound 
corporate governance systems (i.e., the clientele effect).17 As will be discussed in more 
detail later, for the examined firms in Kuwait, SWF ownership had been in place since the 
firms’ establishment, thus reducing some of the reverse causality concern. Therefore, we 
would argue that the evidence points to the monitoring on the part of the SWF bringing 
good governance to the firm, rather than the other way around.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to existing research 
on institutional investors and to the growing literature on SWFs. It specifically contributes 
to the ongoing debate on whether SWFs create or destroy value in their target investments, 
focusing on domestic investments.18 In finding that SWFs improve the pay–performance 
relationship, we provide evidence supporting the notion that SWFs bring value to their 
domestic firms through their activism and corporate governance enhancements.
Second, it contributes to the literature on executive compensation and ownership struc-
ture. While several papers have examined the effect of blockholders, blockholder type and 
various ownership structures on executive pay and the pay–performance relationship,19 
this is the first paper to investigate the effects of a unique actor – SWFs – on executive pay. 
The paper also contributes to the literature by showing how – depending on the owner’s 
incentives and market structure – non-market-based performance measures could be 
used as benchmarks for managerial performance.
15  ‘Fund Rankings’, SWFI - Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Available at https://www.swfinstitute.org/
fund-rankings/ (accessed 2 January 2018).
16  ‘PIFSS’, SWFI - Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Available at https://www.swfinstitute.org/public-inves-
tors/pifss/ (accessed 2 January 2018).
17  James A. Brickley, Ronald C. Lease and Clifford W. Smith, ‘Ownership structure and voting on anti-
takeover amendments’, Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988), pp. 267–91; Franklin Allen, Antonio 
E. Bernardo and Ivo Welch, ‘A theory of dividends based on tax clienteles’, The Journal of Finance, 55/6 
(2000), pp. 2499–536; Brian J. Bushee and Christopher F. Noe, ‘Corporate disclosure practices, institu-
tional investors, and stock return volatility’, Journal of Accounting Research (2000), pp. 171–202.
18  Alhashel, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds’; Megginson and Fotak, ‘Rise of the Fiduciary State’.
19  Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang and Fei Xie, ‘Agency problems at dual-class companies’, The Journal of 
Finance 64/4 (2009), pp. 1697–727; Takao Kato and Cheryl Long, ‘Executive compensation, firm perfor-
mance, and corporate governance in China: Evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 54/4 (2006), pp. 945–83; Firth et al., ‘Corpo-
rate performance and CEO compensation in China’.
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Finally, this paper contributes to the growing literature on executive compensation in 
emerging markets. Given the unique setting of developing nations, which produce sig-
nificantly divergent results from patterns observed in the US or Western Europe, there 
has been great demand for single country research on corporate governance to enhance 
our understanding of it.20 Kuwait, with its large and well-established SWFs, weak investor 
protection, ownership concentration and nascent corporate governance rules, makes for 
an excellent laboratory to test for the impact of distinctive entities such as SWFs on firms.
Institutional Background
The Kuwait Investment Authority dates back to 1953.21 The KIA was established to manage 
the government surpluses generated from oil revenues. It invests those funds locally and 
internationally. The Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute estimates that the KIA has assets 
under management of around $592 billion as of the end of 2016.22
Kuwait also has other funds that could be considered SWFs, albeit on a much smaller scale. 
The PIFSS manages the public pension fund. The third largest fund is the Public Authority 
for Minors’ Affairs (PAMA), which manages the assets for Kuwaiti minors until they reach 
legal age. The fourth is the Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation (KAPF). The KAPF manages 
assets with the aim of spending the returns and proceeds generated from these assets on 
charitable projects and endeavours. The KAPF’s assets are accumulated through new dona-
tions or the organic growth of previous donations. Hence, the KAPF is similar in structure to 
non-profit foundations found in the US and elsewhere. The difference, however, is that the 
KAPF is a government entity and not a private one. All of these funds have assets that vary, 
ranging from equities to alternative assets and from domestic holdings to international ones.
These SWFs’ equity investments in the domestic market tend to occur through two chan-
nels. The first is through investing some of their funds with professional asset managers 
who have high, if not full, discretion regarding the allocation and investment of these 
funds. The second is direct equity ownership in local firms that tend to be of significant 
size (i.e., greater than or equal to 10%). In the second channel, this direct investment 
almost always happens at the point at which the firm is established. In very few instances 
have any of those funds, over our sample period, acquired a stake in the firm at a later 
stage of its life. For example, Kuwait Finance House (KFH), one of the largest and oldest 
20  Mark L. Defond and Mingyi Hung, ‘Investor protection and corporate governance: Evidence from 
worldwide CEO turnover’, Journal of Accounting Research 42/2 (2004), 269–312; Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, 
Robert Mathieu and Mohamed Shehata, ‘Usefulness of comprehensive income reporting in Canada’, 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 28/4 (2009), pp. 349–365; Sunny Li Sun, Xia Zhao and Haibin Yang, 
‘Executive compensation in Asia: A critical review and outlook’, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27/4 
(2010), pp. 775–802.
21  ‘Overview’, Kuwait Investment Authority. Available at http://www.kia.gov.kw/en/ABOUTKIA/Pages/
Overview.aspx (accessed 11 May 2018).
22  ‘Kuwait Investment Autority’, SWFI - Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Available at http://www.swfinsti-
tute.org/swfs/kuwait-investment-authority/ (accessed 11 May 2018).
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Islamic banks in the world, has been owned jointly by the KIA, the PAMA and the KAPF 
with their ownership totalling about 40% since the bank’s establishment in 1977. One 
reason behind the KIA’s method of investing is the Kuwaiti law that requires, when estab-
lishing any state-owned enterprise, that the KIA own significant stakes in excess of 20%. 
The remaining shares are divided between the general public and a private firm. This 
ownership structure is valid for firms in which SWFs have direct ownership and does not 
apply to firms down the ownership chain.
In those firms where the SWFs own a majority, they have seats on the board depending 
on their stake. These seats tend to be filled by those funds’ higher management. Through 
these seats and voting rights, the SWFs, as a dominant shareholder, have a significant say 
in choosing the top management team, setting their pay, and managing the firm. However, 
it could be the case that the SWF is not the only large shareholder in the firm, with other 
large shareholders also sitting on the board of directors.
Kuwait – a developing economy with a relatively small stock exchange, especially in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s – had a tiny number of firms available to be acquired at this 
time. Therefore, firms did not have the luxury to grow through mergers and acquisitions, 
as would be the case in the highly-developed corporate control market of the US. Instead, 
firms resorted to setting up new ventures from scratch in order to enter new businesses 
and grow. KFH is an apposite example, having been set up with the KIA and the other 
SWFs as founders of the bank. Another more recent example is the Aviation Lease and 
Finance Company (ALAFCO). ALAFCO was established by KFH in 2000, giving the bank 
access to the aircraft leasing market. By being on the board of KFH, the SWFs had a say on 
the establishment of such subsidiaries and the practices applied.
This dominant practice of large funds establishing firms (i.e., having the SWF as a founder) 
means the decision to invest in the firm is exogenous to the corporate governance setup 
later on as the firm starts running. By having the decision to invest made exogenously, we 
argue that our findings allow us to make a causal inference between the ownership structure 
of the firm and the pay–performance relationship. In other words, the argument that the 
SWFs were attracted to firms with good corporate governance practices does not apply here. 
The decision on how much to invest is as exogenous as the decision to invest when the firm 
existed only on paper, with no running operations or management to be paid, or any cor-
porate governance mechanisms in place. However, the SWFs could later on – once the firm 
was up and running – alter their investment and ownership level, potentially raising con-
cerns regarding the endogeneity of the decision. It is possible that the corporate governance 
of a firm has an impact on the decision of an SWF to increase or decrease its ownership. If 
this is the case, it would undoubtedly weaken our causal conclusion from the analysis in our 
section ‘Empirical Results’, in which we examine the effects of the size and structure of the 
ownership of the SWF on the pay–performance relationship.
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Hypothesis Development
SWFs are institutional investors that are unique among other kinds of institutional inves-
tors.23 They are state-owned investment vehicles – funded by foreign exchange reserves, 
commodity revenues, government budget surpluses or pension surpluses – that invest in 
various asset classes globally.24 Furthermore, they tend to have mixed objectives and are 
not limited to the standard financial aim of maximising the wealth managed. SWFs could 
be called upon to support their domestic economies, acting in some cases as investors 
and lenders of last resort, as well as possibly having the mandate to generate social, as 
opposed to simply economic, returns.25 An additional feature of SWFs is their ability to 
be very long-term investors. For example, KIA has owned shares in Daimler, the owners 
of Mercedes-Benz, since 1974. KIA’s long-term holdings are not constrained solely to the 
international arena, having owned shares in Zain, the largest telecommunications opera-
tor in Kuwait, since its establishment in 1983.
SWFs, as institutional investors, can bring value to their target investments through their 
monitoring, activism and board representation.26 SWFs value-added potential is further 
augmented by their very long investment horizons and low liquidity requirements that can 
allow them to reach high and effective monitoring levels.27 This high level of monitoring 
would result in a better alignment of managerial and shareholder interests typical to block-
holders as shown by evidence of higher PPS.28 Such intensive monitoring is not without its 
costs, and yet it is significant long-term investors such as SWFs that can afford it.29
However, the nature of these state-owned entities may eventually limit the monitoring 
of firm managers. Limitation of monitoring could be driven either by the rent-seeking of 
23  Megginson and Fotak, ‘Rise of the Fiduciary State’.
24  Alhashel, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds’.
25  Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar, ‘The investment strategies of sovereign wealth 
funds’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 27/2 (2013), pp. 219–38; Alexander Dyck and Adair Morse, 
‘Sovereign Wealth Fund Portfolios’, Technical Report 11–15, Chicago Booth Research Paper (2011).
26  Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny,‘Politicians and Firms’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109/4 
(1994), pp. 995–1025; Michael. P. Smith, ‘Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from 
CalPERS’, The Journal of Finance 51/1 (1996), pp. 227–52.
27  Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford and Kai Li, ‘Monitoring: Which institutions matter?’, Journal of Financial 
Economics 86/2 (2007), pp. 279–305.
28  Bin Ke, Kathy Petroni and Assem Safieddine, ‘Ownership concentration and sensitivity of execu-
tive pay to accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and privately-held insurance 
companies’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 28/2 (1999), pp. 185–209; Kyonghee Kim, ‘Blockholder 
monitoring and the efficiency of pay-performance benchmarking’, Journal of Corporate Finance 16/5 
(2010), pp. 748–66; Hartzell and Starks, ‘Institutional investors and executive compensation’; Kose John, 
Hamid Mehran and Yiming Qian, ‘Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry’, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 16/4 (2010), pp. 383–99.
29  Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, ‘The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and con-
sequences’, Journal of Political Economy 93/6 (1985), pp. 1155–77; Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar and 
Pamela Brandes, ‘Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: A longitudinal examination’, Journal 
of Business Research 58/8 (2005), pp. 1078–88; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Politicians and Firms’.
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politicians,30 a detachment from the firm that is common in state-owned enterprises,31 or 
the pursuit of social goals. If the firm was required to achieve non-financial social objec-
tives (e.g., employment), then managers would not be paid according to their financial 
performance but based on those non-financial social targets.
The empirical evidence on SWFs’ role seems to be mixed. On the one hand, some 
researchers find that SWFs’ investments tend to have higher value, with the premium 
stemming mostly from better governance and activism.32 On the other, there has been 
research showing no value added or, in some cases, value destruction.33 Therefore, we 
hypothesise the following:
H1: SWFs do not affect the PPS of manager pay.
In environments with weak investor protection, lack of proper corporate governance 
rules, and abundant use of cross-holdings and pyramid structures, large shareholders 
have greater incentives to monitor managers and ensure their interests are aligned.
The monitoring incentives could potentially be even higher for SWFs. SWF ownership 
tends to reduce the credit risk and cost of firms.34 Reducing the credit cost of firms may 
then result in a higher cash flow available to management. High levels of free cash flow 
tend to increase the probability of misuse and agency costs.35 Moreover, the lower credit 
risk found for SWFs’ target investments is a result of the conviction that SWFs would bail 
out their target firms if these firms faced financial difficulties. This sense of security would 
therefore increase management’s moral hazard and their tendency to engage in self-en-
riching, value-destroying activities.36 Both of these channels should result in SWFs having 
greater incentives to monitor.
30  Megginson and Fotak, ‘Rise of the Fiduciary State’; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Politicians and Firms’.
31  Andrei Shleifer, ‘State versus private ownership’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12/4 (1998), pp. 133– 
50.
32  Kathryn L. Dewenter, Xi Han and Paul H. Malatesta, ‘Firm values and sovereign wealth fund invest-
ments’, Journal of Financial Economics 98/2 (2010), pp. 256–78; Fernandes, ‘The impact of sovereign 
wealth funds on corporate value and performance’; Elvira Sojli and Wing Wah Tham, ‘The impact of 
foreign government investments: Sovereign wealth fund investments in the United States’, in Institu-
tional Investors in Global Capital Markets (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2011), pp. 
207–43.
33  Jason Kotter and Ugur Lel, ‘Friends or foes? Target selection decisions of sovereign wealth funds and 
their consequences’, Journal of Financial Economics 101/2 (2011), pp. 360–81; April M. Knill, Bong Soo 
Lee and Nathan Mauck, ‘Sovereign wealth fund investment and the return-to-risk performance of target 
firms’, Journal of Financial Intermediation 21/2 (2012), pp. 315–40; Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Fotak and 
William L. Megginson, ‘The sovereign wealth fund discount: Evidence from public equity investments’, 
Review of Financial Studies (2015), pp. 2993–3035.
34  Fabio Bertoni and Stefano Lugo, ‘The effect of sovereign wealth funds on the credit risk of their port-
folio companies’, Journal of Corporate Finance 27 (2014), pp. 21–35.
35  Michael Jensen, ‘Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers’, The American Eco-
nomic Review 76/2 (1986), pp. 323–9.
36  Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care’, The American Economic 
Review 53/5 (1963), pp. 941–973; Mark V. Pauly, ‘The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment’, The Ameri-
can Economic Review (1968), pp. 531–7.
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This monitoring incentive, of course, would increase as the amount of cash-flow rights 
the SWF is entitled to increases.37 We define the ultimate shareholder as the largest share-
holder along the ownership chain. However, as the cash-flow and control rights diverge, 
the monitoring incentives for large shareholders are weakened and instead those share-
holders tend to pursue their private interests at the expense of other shareholders. Such 
expropriation would occur through tunnelling,38 related party sales,39 and transferring 
profits out of the company for personal gain.40 Expropriation is more likely when firms 
have weak corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure requirements.41 While such 
expropriation incentives might not exist for SWFs, they could indeed be of interest to the 
other large shareholders who actively manage the firm through their board seats. SWFs, 
hence, could act as monitors not just of firm managers but of other majority sharehold-
ers, ensuring they do not expropriate from the firm at the expense of the SWF and the 
minority shareholders. However, with the firm so far along the ownership chain, it may 
be difficult for the SWF to ensure other majority shareholders are not expropriating from 
the firm, the managers are not colluding with other majority shareholders to extract rents, 
and/or that managers are paid in a manner commensurate with their performance (i.e., 
properly monitored).42 Therefore, we hypothesise the following:
H2: SWF’s cash-flow rights have a positive effect on the PPS of manager pay.
H3: SWF’s cash-flow / control rights divergence has a negative effect on the PPS of 
manager pay.
37  Cao, Pan and Tian, ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship’.
38  Tunneling is the expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders through the transfer 
of assets and profits for the benefit of the controlling majority shareholders, see Johnson et al., ‘Tun-
neling’.
39  Related party sales is any business deal or arrangement between two parties who are joined by a 
special relationship prior to the deal (e.g. shared ownership, sister companies, shared management).
40  Joseph P. H. Fan, John K. C. Wei and Xinzhong Xu, ‘Corporate finance and governance in emerging 
markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research’, Journal of Corporate Finance 17/2 (2011), 
pp. 207–14.
41  Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang and Junxi Zhang, ‘Private vs state ownership and earnings management: Evi-
dence from Chinese listed companies’, Corporate Governance: An International Review 15/2 (2007), 
223–38.
42  Cao, Pan and Tian, ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship’; Wang 
and Xiao, ‘Controlling shareholders tunneling and executive compensation’; Yan-Leung Cheung, 
Raghavendra Rau and Aris Stouraitis, ‘Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: Evidence from con-
nected party transactions in Hong Kong’, Journal of Financial Economics 82/2 (2006), pp. 343–86; Guohua 
Jiang, Charles M. C. Lee and Heng Yue, ‘Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience’, 
Journal of Financial Economics 98/1 (2010), pp. 1–20.
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Data and Variable Definitions
In this section we discuss our sample and variables constructions and provide summary 
statistics on them. 
Sample
Our sample consists of data on publicly listed firms on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) 
over the period 2004–12. 2004 is the year firms started including top executives’ compen-
sation figures in their annual reports. To compile our database, we manually collected 
executive compensation information directly from annual reports. Ownership informa-
tion was provided by Aljoman Consulting. Financial information was obtained from the 
National Investment Company Investor Pocket Guide and Thomson Reuters Worldscope. 
Information on market values was provided through Alshall Economic Consultants. 
The sample excludes depositary institutions given their different characteristics and 
regulations. Following the combining of these datasets, we arrived at a final sample com-
promising 169 firms and 906 firm-year observations.
Variable Definitions
Executive Compensation
The information provided on executive compensation comprises (a) salaries and other 
short-term benefits, (b) other benefits, and (c) total compensation. The other benefits 
category is only used by a small number of firms. No information is provided on the 
nature of the ‘other benefits’ and this was only reported for about 10 percent of firm-year 
observations in our sample. Given its unclear nature and rare usage, we focus instead on 
the cash and short-term benefits category. Such a focus corresponds with the extant lit-
erature on emerging markets that primarily examines cash pay.43 Moreover, this focus on 
cash and short-term benefits makes sense with respect to the norm in KSE firms in which 
stock options are not a predominant form of compensation. The few firms that do use 
stock options do not disclose this clearly, with someusing the term ‘other compensation’ 
which may include other items the specific nature of which is unclear.44
43  Jean J. Chen, Xuguang Liu and Weian Li, ‘The effect of insider control and global benchmarks on 
Chinese executive compensation’, Corporate Governance: An International Review 18/2 (2010), pp. 107– 
23; Firth, Fung and Rui, ‘Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China’; Michael A. Firth, 
Peter M. Fung and Oliver M. Rui, ‘How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive 
pay in China’s listed firms’, Journal of Business Research 60/7 (2007), pp. 776–85; Cao, Pan and Tian, ‘Dis-
proportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship’; Martin J. Conyon and Lerong He, 
‘Executive compensation and corporate governance in China’, Journal of Corporate Finance 17/4 (2011), 
pp. 1158–75.
44  We have run our analysis taking into account both short-term compensation and the figures available 
for ‘other compensation’ and have arrived at the same results.
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Information on executive compensation is provided for the whole top management team 
and is not reported separately by executive. We have taken the aggregate value of top man-
agement salaries and the ‘other short-term benefits’ category as our measure of executive 
compensation. Since no information is provided in the annual reports on the number of 
executives included in the compensation figures, we refrain from examining levels of pay 
and focus instead on pay–performance relationships only.
Firm Performance
To estimate PPS, we need to tie changes in pay to changes in firm performance. PPS, hence, 
would be the dinar45 change in executive compensation given a dinar change in firm perfor-
mance. We use three different firm performance measures based on accounting and market 
performance: change in market value, change in sales and change in net income. The use 
of three different measures is driven by the possible inclination some boards might have 
towards market performance against accounting performance, or vice versa. We first start 
by examining a market-based measure as captured by the change in equity market value.46 
Such a measure would tie directly to the increase in shareholders’ wealth, is less open to 
managerial manipulation, and reflects a longer-term view of the firm.
A downside, however, for the use of changes in market cap is the possibility that the 
informational efficiency of stock prices is weak or not strong enough and would vary sig-
nificantly across different firms.47 Moreover, changes in market cap could be affected by 
factors beyond managerial control such as macroeconomic shocks. The use of account-
ing-based performance measures is further needed given that bonuses are usually tied to 
accounting profitability.48 The need to use accounting-based measures is also driven by an 
institutional feature of SWFs in Kuwait. All SWFs are monitored by the State Audit Bureau 
(SAB), an independent organisation that audits all government entities and ensures the 
proper use of public funds. In performing this role, the SAB produces its annual report 
that includes data on the SWFs, their significant investments and the overall performance 
of the fund as well as the individual investments or firms. The annual report is submit-
ted to and discussed at length in the parliament and any red flags raised by the SAB can 
then lead to questions asked of the relevant government minister. In assessing the per-
formance of SWFs’ investments, the SAB in many instances focuses on the accounting 
performance of the target firms. Therefore, SWFs are incentivised to ensure the proper 
accounting performance of their holdings. Last but not least, not all SWF representatives 
45  Kuwait’s currency is the dinar.
46  Jensen and Murphy, ‘Performance pay and top-management incentives’; Kevin J. Murphy, ‘Corporate 
performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 
7/1 (1985), pp. 11–42.
47  Walid Abdmoulah, ‘Testing the evolving efficiency of Arab stock markets’, International Review of 
Financial Analysis 19/1 (2010), pp. 25–34; Jasim Al-Ajmi and Jae H. Kim, ‘Are Gulf stock markets efficient? 
Evidence from new multiple variance ratio tests’, Applied Economics 44/14 (2012), pp. 1737–47; Bader S. 
Alhashel, ‘Rights offering announcements and the efficiency of the Kuwaiti market’, Applied Economics 
Letters (2016), pp. 1–5.
48  Murphy, ‘Executive compensation’.
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in boardrooms are well-versed in finance or investment, with many coming from legal 
backgrounds. Given their lack of formal financial training, some SWF representatives may 
push for performance measures they feel better acquainted with.
To adequately address these issues and to capture the possible variation across board-
rooms in setting performance targets, we have augmented the market measure with two 
accounting-based measures: change in sales and change in net income.49 We have included 
sales as a metric given its better reflection of the operating performance of the firm, as net 
income may be more susceptible to accounting manipulation as well as including non-
core earnings such as asset sales. We looked at contemporaneous changes in our firm 
performance measures when assessing PPS for all of our specifications.
SWFs, Cash-Flow Rights and Control Rights
In assessing the effect of SWFs on executive pay, we determine the ultimate controlling 
shareholder by tracking it across the ownership chain. We define a principal ultimate 
owner as the shareholder who owns the largest portion of the firm’s shares with the pro-
portion being no less than 10 percent.50 In this paper, we are interested in understanding 
the effect of the SWF ownership on firms; the latter being any firm ultimately owned by 
one of the four SWFs operating in Kuwait. In the instances where two or more of these 
funds are significant owners of the firm, we sum their ownership and consider them a 
single entity. This computation makes sense as all four funds are state-owned with some 
being chaired by the same minister, such as KIA and PIFSS, which would imply coherence 
in their goals, mandates and behaviour.
We also examine the effects of the divergence of control and cash-flow rights on PPS. We 
define control rights as the minimum level of ownership in the ownership chain of the 
ultimate major shareholder. Cash-flow rights are defined as the product of the ownership 
levels along the ownership chain.51 The divergence between the two is calculated as control 
rights minus cash-flow rights. The divergence between cash-flow and control rights is 
an essential feature of ownership structures as it measures the degree of entrenchment, 
agency problems and value destruction in the firm.52 Such a divergence would emerge 
when ownership is based on pyramid structures and cross-holdings.53 To get a sense of 
how cash flow and control rights are measured, let us assume Firm A has a 35% ownership 
in Firm B. Firm A, in turn, is owned by a private family firm that holds 10% of Firm A’s 
shares. The family firm’s cash-flow rights would be 35% × 10% = 3.5%, and their control 
rights would be the minimal shareholding level along the ownership chain, which is 10%.
49  Core and Guay, ‘The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels’.
50  Cao et al., ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship’; Claessens et al., 
‘Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings’.
51  La Porta et al., ‘Corporate ownership around the world’; Claessens et al., ‘Disentangling the incentive 
and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings’.
52  Ibid.; Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, ‘The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of verti-
cal and lateral integration’, The Journal of Political Economy (1986), pp. 691–719.
53  La Porta et al., ‘Corporate ownership around the world’.
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Sample Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our sample. We can see that the average top man-
agement team (TMT) receives almost 590,000 dinars in cash pay annually, which at the 
time of the sample period corresponded to about $2 million.54 We can also see from the 
table that the average firm has a Tobin’s q of 1.106 and a leverage of about 28%. The ultimate 
owner in the average firm has cash-flow rights of about 21% and a cash-flow / control rights 
divergence of approximately 4%. Such figures would indicate that about half of the ultimate 
owners have direct ownership in the firm, i.e. not through cross-holdings and pyramid struc-
tures. SWFs are the ultimate owners in about 14% of the firm-year observations.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004–12. All figures are in 
Kuwaiti dinar.
Sector N Mean Median Min Max SD
Cash Pay (thousands) 906 593.6 274.2 4 33184 1515.3
Market Cap (millions) 906 144.6 48.82 2.195 7241.4 465.8
Tobin’s q 906 1.098 0.933 0.129 7.310 0.648
Total Assets (millions) 906 191.5 94.60 1.975 5568.2 424.1
Sales (millions) 906 57.09 13.30 -72.29 2003.1 205.7
Net Income (millions) 906 5.969 1.756 -282.0 521.7 40.71
Leverage 906 0.278 0.264 0 1.491 0.204
Cash-Flow Rights 906 0.208 0.136 0 0.958 0.202
CCD 906 0.0410 0 0 0.274 0.0675
SWF 906 0.127 0 0 1 0.333
Table 2 shows us the evolution of pay over the sample years. We can see that pay con-
tinued increasing until 2007 after which it dropped following the global market crash at 
the end of 2008 which continued well into 2009. From 2008, pay almost remained flat in 
terms of averages except for 2010. 
54  The exchange rate was 1 dinar ≈ $ 3.6.
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Table 2: Executive Pay by Year
This table shows the total executive pay annually over the sample period. Variables are as defined in the 
Appendix. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004–2012. All figures 
are in Kuwaiti dinar.
Year N Mean Median Min Max SD
2004 28 433.8 236.6 30 3005 612.3
2005 73 595.5 222 19 6338 1022.2
2006 125 464.8 236.3 4 4127 701.7
2007 129 656.2 278 24 7511 1136.1
2008 144 530.7 272.1 5.134 7218 966.5
2009 144 529.5 258.6 21.53 8540 1061.7
2010 149 698.6 231.3 18.24 33184 2809.3
2011 145 543.5 276.3 11.27 9227 1137.8
2012 144 537.6 275.6 17.44 9623 1154.2
Total 1081 565.5 256.8 4 33184 1413.4
Table 3 shows the distribution of compensation across the KSE sectors. We can see that 
there are significant variations across the industries with the insurance sector having the 
lowest pay. The variation in wages across industries, however, is lower when looking at 
the median pay. This variation is most likely due to the significant firm size variation that 
is observed within some industries.
Table 3: Executive Pay by Industry
Industry classifications are per the Kuwait Stock Exchange’s during the sample period. Variables are 
as defined in the Appendix. The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 
2004–12. All figures are in Kuwaiti dinar.
Industry N Mean Median Min Max SD
Food 81 504.5 282.9 11.27 4687 767.4
Industrials 175 420.5 201.4 5.134 6798 864.9
Insurance 48 192.7 163.6 78 464.9 91.86
Investment 287 745.9 336.2 4 9623 1308.8
Real Estate 182 369.6 307.2 18.24 2022.2 299.1
Services 308 669.8 217.3 18 33184 2168.3
Total 1081 565.5 256.8 4 33184 1413.4
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Table 4 provides insight into the proportion of firms with an SWF as an ultimate owner. 
We can see that the SWFs’ ultimate ownership by 2012 was half the ownership levels they 
had at the beginning of the sample period. Recall that these are instances in which the 
SWF is the ultimate owner with no less than 10% control rights in the firm. This drop in 
the proportion of firms ultimately owned by an SWF is driven by changes in the sample 
composition as an increasing number of new firms got listed over the sample period; 
primarily small firms that do not have SWF ownership. Over our sample period, in firms 
where SWFs are the ultimate owners, their cash-flow rights start at an average of about 
22.5% in 2004, raising to a peak of 27.5% in 2008, to go back to 24.7% at the end of our 
sample period.
Table 4: SWF Ownership over Time
The sample consists of Kuwait non-bank firms over the sample period 2004–12.
Year SWF Ultimate Owner
2004 0.261
2005 0.281
2006 0.216
2007 0.154
2008 0.107
2009 0.113
2010 0.116
2011 0.118
2012 0.0909
Total 0.138
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of our variables. We can see, as is heavily documented 
in the extant literature, that pay is highly correlated with firm size, whether measured 
using market cap, total assets or sales.
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Empirical Results
In this section, we examine the effect of having an SWF as the ultimate owner on PPS for 
the firm’s executives. We start by examining the effect of the mere presence of an SWF, 
H1, and then expand by taking into account its cash-flow rights. Our last set of analysis 
intends to test H2 and H3 regarding the effect of cash-flow rights and the cash-flow / 
control rights divergence of the SWF on PPS.
SWFs and the Pay–Performance Relationship
Our first step is to examine PPS in Kuwaiti listed firms while taking into account the 
impact of having an SWF as an ultimate owner. We do that by estimating the following 
model:
∆Payit = βo + +β1∆Perfit * SWFit + β2∆Perfit + β3SW Fit + β4Xit
+γi + ζt + eit
where i and t represent firm and year, respectively, ∆Pay is the change in pay as defined 
earlier, Perf is one of the performance measures discussed earlier and ∆Perf is the change 
in this performance measure, SWF is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest share-
holder is a SWF and zero otherwise, X represents control variables,55 γ is the industry 
fixed effect, ζ is the year fixed effect, and e is the error term. All errors are clustered at 
the firm level.56 By examining the change in compensation relative to the change in per-
formance, as in Equation (1), we can assess the degree of alignment between the interests 
of the managers and the shareholders (i.e., PPS).57 Furthermore, sensitivity specifications 
can easily be interpreted economically and would straightforwardly tell us the managerial 
share of the value creation.58 Additionally, change specifications allow us to control for 
CEO-specific factors and eliminate time-invariant firm fixed effect.59
55  Using lagged control variables does not affect our results.
56  Mitchell A. Petersen, ‘Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing approaches’, 
Review of Financial Studies 22/1 (2009), p. 435.
57  Martin J. Conyon and Kevin J. Murphy, ‘The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and 
United Kingdom’, The Economic Journal 110/467 (2000), pp. 640–71; Anne T. Coughlan and Ronald M. 
Schmidt, ‘Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical inves-
tigation’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7/1-3 (1985), pp. 43–66; Jensen and Murphy, ‘Performance 
pay and top-management incentives’; Murphy, ‘Corporate performance and managerial remuneration’.
58  Murphy, ‘Executive Compensation’.
59  Conyon and He, ‘Executive compensation and corporate governance in China’; Scott B. Jackson, 
Thomas J. Lopez and Austin L. Reitenga, ‘Accounting fundamentals and CEO bonus compensation’, 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27/5 (2008), pp. 374–93; Murphy, ‘Executive Compensation’.
(1)
Bader S. Alhashel and Sulaiman H. Albader 21 
Similar to Hartzell and Starks, Firth et al., Conyon and He and Cao et al., we control for 
Tobin’s q, firm size and leverage.60 Firm size, measured as the market cap of the firm, has 
been extensively documented61 as related to executive pay, PPS and the level of institu-
tional ownership in the firm.62 Tobin’s q, a proxy for growth opportunities, has been shown 
to affect managerial incentives. Both Smith and Watts and Harvey and Shrieves argue 
that firms with more significant growth opportunities are harder to monitor and hence it 
becomes essential to use pay incentive mechanisms to align the interests of shareholders 
and managers.63 We define Tobin’s q as total market capitalisation plus debt divided by the 
total book value of assets. Leverage, defined as debt divided by the book value of assets, 
can affect the structure of compensation contracts used by the firm to better align the 
interests of managers and debtholders.64 The use of industry-fixed effects is to capture any 
industry-specific practices regarding compensation, industry-specific managerial talents 
or SWF’s preference for specific industries.65 Table 3 shows a list of the industries in our 
sample following the KSE classification.66 Year fixed effects are used to capture any mac-
roeconomic shocks impacting the whole market.
Table 6, overleaf, shows the regression results of change in pay on change in performance 
and sovereign wealth fund ownership. The dependent variable is change in cash pay, with 
the sample consisting of Kuwaiti non-bank firms over the sample period 2004–12.
60  Hartzell and Starks, ‘Institutional investors and executive compensation’; Firth, Fung and Rui, ‘Cor-
porate performance and CEO compensation in China’; Conyon and He, ‘Executive compensation and 
corporate governance in China’; Cao, Pan and Tian, ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–per-
formance relationship’.
61  Murphy, ‘Executive Compensation’; Martin J. Conyon, ‘Corporate governance and executive com-
pensation’, International Journal of Industrial Organization 15/4 (1997), pp. 493–509; George P. Baker and 
Brian J. Hall, ‘CEO incentives and firm size’, Journal of Labor Economics 22/4 (2004), pp. 767–98; Scott 
Schaefer, ‘The dependence of pay–performance sensitivity on the size of the firm’, Review of Economics 
and Statistics 80/3 (1998), pp. 436–43; Richard W. Sias and Laura T. Starks, ‘Institutions and individuals at 
the turn-of-the-year’, The Journal of Finance 52/4 (1997), pp. 1543–62.
62  We arrived at similar findings using firm assets as a measure of firm size.
63  Clifford W. Smith and Ross L. Watts, ‘The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, div-
idend, and compensation policies’, Journal of Financial Economics 32/3 (1992), pp. 263–92; Keith D. 
Harvey and Ronald E. Shrieves, ‘Executive compensation structure and corporate governance choices’, 
Journal of Financial Research 24/4 (2001), pp. 495–512.
64  Teresa A. John and Kose John, ‘Top-management compensation and capital structure’, The Journal of 
Finance 48/3 (1993), pp. 949–74.
65  Robert L. Lippert, William T. Moore, et al., ‘Compensation contracts of chief executive officers: Deter-
minants of pay-performance sensitivity’, Journal of Financial Research 17/3 (1994), pp. 321–32.
66  The sector classification is currently different. However, we have opted to use the original designation 
that was prevalent during most of the sample period.
22 How do Sovereign Wealth Funds Pay their Portfolio Companies’ Executives?
Table 6: Pay–Performance Relationship and Ultimate Owner
t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
∆Market Cap*SWF 0.001* 
(1.69)
∆Sales*SWF 0.004*** 
(4.32)
∆Net Income*SWF 0.029*** 
(5.32)
∆Market Cap 0.002** 
(2.17)
∆Sales 0.001* 
(1.37)
∆Net Income 0.005*** 
(3.97)
SWF 3.534 
(0.12)
-78.716 
(-0.76)
-6.321 
(-0.07)
Market Cap (millions) 0.355*** 
(11.45)
0.486*** 
(5.97)
0.539*** 
(9.53)
Tobin’s q 24.690 
(0.43)
45.596 
(1.06)
26.100 
(0.55)
Leverage -206.341 
(-1.26)
-147.160 
(-1.50)
-105.903 
(-1.30)
Obs. 780 795 797
Adj R-Sq 0.298 0.170 0.235
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
The Equation (1) estimates are shown in Table 6 for the three different performance mea-
sures. The table indicates that, on average, there exists a PPS as evidenced by the significant 
and positive coefficients on ∆Market Cap and ∆Net Income. The evidence indicates that 
a KWD 1,000 change in net profit increases top managerial pay by KWD 5. We also find 
that larger firms have greater pay changes annually, as documented in the literature. More 
importantly, we can see that ultimate ownership by an SWF has a positive and significant 
effect on PPS. This effect is evidenced by the significant coefficients for the interaction 
terms across the three columns. Having an SWF as the ultimate owner increases PPS from 
0.001 to 0.005 if performance is measured using change in sales, and from 0.005 to 0.034 
if measuring net income. When performance is measured using market cap, having an 
SWF as the ultimate shareholder increases the sensitivity from 0.002 to 0.003. These are 
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very noteworthy increases in PPS relative to the baseline sensitivity as captured by the 
coefficients on the performance measures.
To get a better sense of these pay–performance elasticities, we compared our figures with 
those reported for the US. Murphy reports elasticities ranging between 0.005–0.014 for 
the cash pay / shareholder wealth relationship for firms in the early 1990s.67 Our estimates 
for SWFs when change is measured in dinar, ranging from 0.005–0.029, would put them 
in line with those found in the US. In other words, having the SWFs as ultimate owners 
raises PPS to that documented in highly-developed markets.
The results from Table 6 support the hypothesis that SWFs add value to firms through 
their active board roles and corporate governance enhancements.
SWF Cash-Flow Rights and the Pay–Performance Relationship
In this section, we look at the size of the ultimate owner’s incentives by examining his 
cash-flow rights instead of a dummy variable as in the previous section. By examining the 
ultimate owner’s cash-flow rights, we can further understand the effect of SWF ownership 
on PPS as their incentives in the firm change. We adjusted our previous specification in 
a similar vein to Firth et al., Canarella and Nourayi, and Cao et al.68 It is, then, as follows:
∆Payit = βo + +β1∆Perfit * SWF Cashit + β2∆Perfit * Cash flow rightsit + 
β3∆Perfit + β4Cash flow rightsit + β5Xit +γi + ζt + eit
where SWF Cash is the cash-flow rights of the SWF and Cash flow rights is the cash-flow 
rights of the ultimate owner. By controlling for the level of the cash-flow rights for the ulti-
mate owner, we are also capturing the monitoring incentives for the largest shareholder in 
the ownership chain.69 70
67  Murphy, ‘Executive Compensation’.
68  Firth, Fung and Rui, ‘Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China’; Firth, Fung and Rui, 
‘How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China’s listed firms’; Giorgio 
Canarella and Mahmoud M. Nourayi, ‘Executive compensation and firm performance: Adjustment 
dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry’, Managerial and Decision Economics 29/4 (2008), pp. 293–315; 
Cao, Pan and Tian, ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship’.
69  Chen, Harford and Li, ‘Monitoring: Which institutions matter?’; Mariassunta Giannetti and Luc 
Laeven, ‘Pension reforms, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment’, The Review of Financial Studies 22/10 (2009), pp. 4091–127.
70  We have rerun the above specification with the inclusion of the SWF dummy from Equation (1) to 
capture the sole effect of the firm being ultimately owned by the SWF. We arrived at similar results.
(2)
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Table 7: Pay–Performance Relationship, Cash-Flow Rights and Ultimate 
Owner
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change in performance and sovereign wealth 
fund cash-flow rights. The dependent variable is change in cash pay. The sample consists of Kuwait non-
bank firms over the sample period 2004–12. Variables are as defined in the Appendix. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
∆Market Cap*SWF CF Rights 0.004 
(1.42)
∆Sales*SWF CF Rights 0.015*** 
(21.16)
∆Net Income*SWF CF Rights 0.087** 
(2.02)
∆Market Cap*CF Rights 0.003 
(0.89)
∆Sales*CF Rights 0.010*** 
(11.06)
∆Net Income*CF Rights -0.011 
(-1.49)
∆Market Cap 0.002* 
(1.69)
∆Sales -0.000 
(-1.38)
∆Net Income 0.009*** 
(2.77)
Cash-Flow Rights 41.286 
(0.59)
10.641 
(0.17)
-2.114 
(-0.03)
Market Cap (millions) 0.359*** 
(13.64)
0.484*** 
(9.08)
0.557*** 
(12.55)
Tobin’s q 16.566 
(0.32)
31.739 
(0.85)
27.150 
(0.64)
Leverage -205.528 
(-1.25)
-134.264 
(-1.41)
-144.561 
(-1.65)
Obs. 780 795 797
Adj R-Sq 0.297 0.174 0.204
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
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The estimates are shown in Table 7, broken down by our three performance measures. As 
was established in the previous table, there is a positive and significant relationship between 
performance and pay as captured by changes in market cap and changes in net income. 
We can also see that increases in the cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner enhance PPS, 
though this only holds true when net income is used as a performance measure.
We now move on to look at the interaction terms between performance and the cash-flow 
rights of SWFs. We can see that as SWFs’ cash-flow rights increase, PPS is strengthened. 
However, as in Table 6, this is only true if performance is measured using changes in 
sales and net income. This augmentation that SWFs bring to the pay–performance elas-
ticity is statistically significant at 1% and 5% changes in sales and net income, respectively. 
A one standard deviation increase in the SWF’s cash-flow rights, i.e. 0.2, results in the 
pay–performance elasticity reaching 0.000+0.010*0.2+0.2*0.015 = 0.005, a 150% increase 
from the base elasticity of 0.000+0.010*0.2 = 0.002. Increases of similar magnitude are 
observed for comparable changes in SWF cash-flow rights when performance is measured 
using change in net income.
Overall, the results support the notion that the higher the cash-flow rights of SWFs, the 
higher the benefits they bring to the firm through paying managers commensurately with 
their performance.
SWFs, Ownership Structure and the Pay–Performance Relationship
In this section, we examine the intersection of SWF ownership and the structures they 
utilise to hold the firm’s shares. Mainly, we try to understand how PPS is affected by 
pyramid structures or cross-holdings in which the ultimate owner residing at the top of 
the chain is an SWF. Here we utilise our earlier specification, Equation (2), but use cash-
flow / control rights divergence in place of cash-flow rights, as in Cao et al.,71 as follows:
∆Payit = βo + +β1∆Perfit * SWF CCDit + β2∆Perfit * CCDit + β3∆Perfit + 
β4CCDit + β5Xit +γi + ζt + eit
where SWF CCD is the cash-flow / control rights divergence of the SWF and CCD is 
the cash-flow control rights of the ultimate shareholder. The rest of the variables are as 
defined previously.72
71  Cao, Pan and Tian, ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship’.
72  Some studies also control for the cash-flow rights when looking at the wedge between cash-flow rights 
and control rights (Claessens et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2011). We reran our analysis by doing so and arrived 
at similar results.
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Table 8: Pay–Performance Relationship, Ownership Structure and  
Ultimate Owner
This table shows the regression results of change in pay on change in performance and sovereign wealth 
fund control rights / cash-flow rights divergence. The dependent variable is change in cash pay. The 
sample consists of Kuwaiti non-bank firms over the sample period 2004–12. Variables are as defined in 
the Appendix. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
∆Market Cap*SWF CCD 0.020** 
(2.32)
∆Sales*SWF CCD -0.110 
(-1.44)
∆Net Income*SWF CCD 0.020 
(0.56)
∆Market Cap*CCD -0.032*** 
(-3.75)
∆Sales*CCD 0.030*** 
(-5.38)
∆Net Income*CCD -0.025 
(-0.57)
∆Market Cap 0.003*** 
(20.68)
∆Sales -0.005*** 
(5.19)
∆Net Income 0.010** 
(2.03)
CCD -471.230** 
(-1.99)
136.320 
(0.76)
-23.631 
(-0.15)
Market Cap (millions) 0.354*** 
(11.27)
0.490*** 
(7.72)
0.604*** 
(10.43)
Tobin’s q 11.369 
(0.21)
32.475 
(1.02)
27.268 
(0.71)
Leverage -177.220 
(-1.05)
-126.491 
(-1.21)
-173.479* 
(-1.78)
Obs. 780 795 797
Adj R-Sq 0.303 0.157 0.126
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8 reports the estimates of Equation (3). As in our earlier tables, we find that a pay–
performance relationship exists that is statistically significant for the average firm across 
all three performance measures. We can see that in both columns 1 and 2 the higher the 
divergence in the cash-flow and control rights of the ultimate shareholder the worse PPS 
is, as evidenced by the negative coefficients on ∆Market Cap*CCD and ∆Sales*CCD. 
This effect is statistically significant at 5 percent in both columns. This adverse effect is in 
line with the literature’s findings.73
More important is the effect of having an SWF as the ultimate shareholder on the diver-
gence-pay relationship. We find that, as reported in column 1, that the SWF being the 
ultimate shareholder dampens the adverse effect of the cash-flow / control rights diver-
gence. This dampening effect is statistically and economically significant. Having the SWF 
as the ultimate shareholder reduces the adverse effect of the divergence from -0.032 to 
-0.032 + 0.020 = -0.012, a reduction of more than 60 percent in the combined coefficient. 
This positive effect for SWFs is, however, lacking when examining performance using 
sales or net income, as in columns 2 and 3 respectively.
To summarise, we find evidence in support of our hypothesis that a more considerable 
divergence between the cash-flow and control rights results in a weaker PPS. This finding 
corresponds with the extant literature that finds the separation of ownership and control 
fostering weaker corporate governance and, hence, allowing managers and majority share-
holders to enjoy rents at the expense of shareholders.74 This weaker PPS could be explained 
as follows: as firms move down the ownership chain away from their ultimate shareholder, 
it becomes easier for management or other majority shareholders to expropriate from the 
firm and for management not be paid in a manner commensurate with their performance. 
However, having an SWF as the ultimate shareholder at the end of this chain helps to 
reduce the adverse effect of this distance and reduced monitoring ability. This finding 
further corroborates the conclusions of the earlier tables on the positive value SWFs bring 
to firms by better aligning the incentives of shareholders and managers.
Robustness
One possible concern with our findings is that the documented SWF effect on PPS could 
be happening as a result of the presence of any large owners, be they a family or an insti-
tution, regardless of type. To disentangle this effect, we would need to observe the impact 
of non-SWF ownerships on PPS. We have done this by adding to Equation (1) a dummy 
variable for large non-SWF owners and an interaction between the performance measure 
and this dummy variable. We define the non-SWF large owner dummy as equal to one if 
the firm is ultimately owned by a non-SWF entity with ownership greater than 10 percent; 
and zero otherwise. We find, in a set of unreported results, that the positive effect of SWFs 
on PPS holds even after controlling for the possible impact of other large shareholders.
73  Cao, Pan and Tian, ‘Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship’.
74  Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, ‘Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large 
shareholdings’; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer, ‘Corporate ownership around the world’.
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Conclusion
The rise of SWFs over the last decades has attracted significant attention from both aca-
demics and practitioners. This was especially true at the dawn of the 2008 financial crisis 
when several SWFs acted as lenders and investors of last resort for some of the most 
significant global banks. The unique structure and objectives of SWFs, in comparison to 
other institutional investors, has driven researchers to attempt to better understand them. 
In this paper, we have tried to contribute to the literature’s understanding of SWFs as 
investors and the potential value they may add or destroy in their firm holdings. We tackle 
this by examining the effect SWFs have on executive compensation in their firm holdings. 
Specifically, we investigate their effect on the alignment of managerial pay and perfor-
mance in Kuwaiti listed firms.
We have shown that SWFs bring significant enhancements with regards to the alignment 
of executive pay with performance. Having an SWF increases PPS by four-fold, a very 
substantial increase. The findings show that SWFs have an influence on the pay–perfor-
mance relationship when performance is assessed on an accounting basis. This influence 
is more significant the higher the SWF’s cash-flow rights in the firm. This positive influ-
ence remains even if the SWFs’ control and cash-flow rights diverge. Having an SWF as 
the ultimate shareholder reduces the adverse effect of the divergence on PPS by more 
than 60 percent.
We argue that this evidence, while not wholly free of endogeneity, does carry some causal 
weight. We base this argument on the fact that in all firms studied, SWFs were found-
er-shareholders and, therefore, the decision to invest was exogenous to the compensation 
scheme and corporate governance practices applied to the firm later in its life. However, 
this argument is weakened by the fact that later changes in the ownership level could 
represent a manifestation of a clientele effect. Therefore, it is not possible to say that our 
results are endogeneity-free.
The results indicate that SWFs bring value to their target holdings. We show that this value 
is achieved by using better executive compensation, to which their board representation 
allows direct access. This success in board activism, corporate governance enhancements, 
and monitoring is in contrast to the documented evidence in the extant literature on the 
failure of state-owned entities in this regard. The findings indicate that SWFs use incen-
tive compensation and directly tie managerial pay to firm performance to reduce agency 
costs. This conclusion goes to support the previous findings in the literature on the value 
of SWFs’ activism.75
The finding that SWFs bring value to their firms through better management monitoring 
should promote additional research on other value enhancement mechanisms SWFs 
might put forward. These could range from the proper management of a firm’s cash 
75  Dewenter, Han and Malatesta, ‘Firm values and sovereign wealth fund investments’; Fernandes, ‘The 
impact of sovereign wealth funds on corporate value and performance’; Sojli and Wah Tham, ‘The 
impact of foreign government investments’.
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holding and investments to its dividend policy. Future research could also try to under-
stand whether SWFs’ behaviour and activism depends on whether their target holdings 
are domestic or international. Investigating the effects along domestic and international 
holdings is important given the diverse range of behaviours that SWFs observe with 
foreign holdings vis-à-vis domestic ones.76 Such differences across countries could arise 
due to the mixed objectives SWFs might have with their local investments. Moreover, 
SWFs’ behaviour in international markets may differ based on the host country’s recep-
tiveness to foreign investment and the type of diplomatic relations between the SWF’s 
country and the host.
Appendix: Variable and Acronym Definitions
Sector Definition
Cash Pay The salaries and other short-term compensation received by the top management 
team (in thousands).
Market Cap The market capitalisation of the firm (in thousands) calculated as the stock price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (in millions).
Tobin’s q Calculated as the market cap of the firm plus its debts divided by the book value of 
assets.
Total Assets The total assets of the firm.
Sales The total sales of the firm (in thousands).
Net Income The net income of the firm (in thousands).
Leverage Calculated as the firm’s debt divided by total assets.
Cash-Flow Rights The product of the ownership levels along the ownership chain of the ultimate major 
shareholder.
Control-Rights The minimum level of ownership in the ownership chain of the ultimate major 
shareholder.
CCD The difference between the ultimate shareholder’s control and cash-flow rights.
SWF A dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is a SWF, 0 otherwise.
76  Dewenter et al., ‘Firm values and sovereign wealth fund investments’; Afshin Mehrpouya, Chaoni 
Huang, Timothy Barnett, ‘An Analysis of Proxy Voting and Engagement Policies and Practices of the 
Sovereign Wealth Funds’, IRRCi SWF Report (2009); Kotter and Lel, ‘Friends or foes? Target selection 
decisions of sovereign wealth funds and their consequences’; Paul Rose, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Active or Passive Investors?’, Yale Law Journal Pocket Part 118 (2008), p. 104.
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